We introduce a parametric model of other-regarding preferences in which my emotional state determines the marginal rate of substitution between my own and others' payoffs, and thus my subsequent choices. In turn, my emotional state responds to relative status and to the kindness or unkindness of others' choices. Structural estimations of this model with six existing data sets demonstrate that other-regarding preferences depend on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights.
Introduction
Everyone knows that people care about other people. Economists have known it at least since Adam Smith, but only recently have begun to recognize the need for explicit models.
Under what circumstances will I bear a personal cost to help or harm you? What is the marginal rate of substitution between my own payoff and yours? The goal of this paper is to propose a model that addresses such questions and, using some existing laboratory data, to illustrate its application. am more likely to value your welfare. Of course, economists are familiar with folk theorem arguments that I help you now so that you will help me later and thereby increase the net present value of my payoff stream. Reciprocity in the present paper refers to something quite different, although complementary: if you are my friend, I find it pleasurable to increase your material payoff, whether or not it affects the present value of my own material payoff.
Negative reciprocity is also included: if you are my foe (e.g., I think you have harmed me or want to do so), I enjoy decreasing your material payoff. Smith (1759) refers to these emotions as the "moral sentiments" of gratitude and resentment, and suggests three necessary conditions for their proper expression.
Our model formalizes the idea. In the model, status and reciprocity affect my emotional state, summarized in a scalar variable θ, and my emotional state affects my choices. Smith Section 2 sets the stage by summarizing some recent related literature. Section 3 proposes specifications of the model elements r, s, and θ(r, s), and proposes a more general utility function that allows non-linear indifference curves. This utility function parsimoniously captures various concerns regarding other players' payoffs, e.g., a concern for efficiency as well as a greater concern for those with lower incomes.
Sections 4 through 8 apply the model to existing laboratory data. Each of these applications builds on those that precede it in a natural way. In Section 4 we estimate utility function parameters from a dictator game. The results indicate that decision makers have other-regarding preferences that can be captured by a utility function with convex indifference curves, and that dictators exhibit residual altruism. Section 5 examines a Stackelberg duopoly game. The results confirm reciprocity: the generosity of the first mover's output decision affects the second mover's emotional state and output choice. Section 6 examines mini-ultimatum games in which the alternatives available to proposers vary across games.
We find again that reciprocity significantly affects responder behavior, and we also find that responders' reference payoff levels (or "property rights") depend on the alternatives open to first movers. By contrast, currently popular models of unconditional distributional preferences predict that the alternatives not chosen have no effect. Section 7 examines the effects of status as well as reciprocity in an ultimatum game with both random and contest role assignment treatments. Section 8 briefly describes further applications. These include analysis of the earned income treatment from the dictator game in Section 4; a demonstration -based on a dictator treatment from an investment game experiment -that decision makers with a positive emotional state can exhibit a preference for efficiency; and analysis of a game with complicated choice sets, which demonstrates the flexibility and generality of both our utility model and our estimation procedure. Section 9 presents a concluding discussion. Technical details appear in the appendices.
Recent approaches
Economic models traditionally assume that decision-makers are exclusively motivated by material self-interest. Maximization of own material payoff predicts behavior quite well in many contexts. Examples include competitive markets, even when gains from trade go almost entirely to sellers or almost entirely to buyers (Smith and Williams, 1990 ); one-sided auctions with independent private values (Cox and Oaxaca, 1996) ; procurement contracting (Cox, Isaac, Cech, and Conn, 1996) ; and search (Cason and Friedman, 2003; Oaxaca, 1989, 2000; Harrison and Morgan, 1990 ).
Maximization of own material payoff predicts poorly in a variety of other contexts. opportunities for punishing free riders, e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000a) , and experimental labor markets (e.g., Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997). Fehr and Gächter (2000b) summarize recent evidence on the economic impact of motives beyond self-interest.
The laboratory data, together with suggestive field data, have encouraged the development of models of other-regarding preferences. This literature falls into two broad classes.
First there are the relative payoff (or distributional) models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , and Cox and Sadiraj (2005) and the basic ("intentions-free") model in Charness and Rabin (2002) . To facilitate comparison with our specifications, we write out two-player versions of these models. The main alternatives so far to these distributional preference models are equilibrium models that try to capture the reciprocity motive in terms of beliefs regarding intentions. Building on the psychological games literature (e.g., Geanakoplos, Pearse and Stacchetti, 1989), Rabin (1993) develops a theory of fairness equilibria (for two player games in normal form) based on the following representation of agents' utilities. Define a i , b j , and c i , respectively, as the strategy chosen by player i, the belief of player i about the strategy chosen by player j, and the belief by player i about the belief by player j about the strategy chosen by player i. Rabin (1993 Rabin ( , pp. 1286 writes the expected utility function for player
, where π i (a i , b j ) is the monetary payoff to player i,f j (b j , c i ) is player i's belief about how kind player j is being to him, and f i (a i , b j ) is how kind player i is being to player j (relative to a benchmark taken to be the average of the highest and lowest possible payoffs). Thus negative reciprocity (f j < 0 and
as well as positive reciprocity increases utility. The model looks for equilibria in actions and beliefs about intended kindness; typically there are many such equilibria. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) propose an extension to extensive form games with N players, and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) propose a different extension that also covers incomplete information but uses a distributional preference utility function. Charness and Rabin (2002) , in addition to their distributional model, propose an equilibrium model involving distributional preferences and beliefs about other players intentions. All the equilibrium models are complex and have many equilibria, and so seem intractable in most applications.
Such problems seem unavoidable for models that assume equilibrium in higher order beliefs.
Levine ( 1+λ y, where a m ∈ (−1, 1) is my type or "coefficient of altruism," a y ∈ (−1, 1) is my current estimate of your type, and λ ∈ [0, 1] is a weight parameter. Levine demonstrates that his model is consistent with data from some ultimatum games and market experiments, and it clearly is more tractable than the previous equilibrium models.
We propose a more drastic simplification. Instead of beliefs or type estimates we use emotional states based on experience: my attitude towards your payoff depends on my state of mind, e.g., kind or vengeful, and your actual behavior systematically alters my emotional state. 1 Our model is consistent with the axiomatic approaches of Sobel (2005) and Guttman (2000) but is more explicit. It is simply a preference model, not an equilibrium model, and therefore sidesteps many of the complications involving higher order beliefs. But unlike the distributional preference models discussed above, in our model an agent's distributional preferences are conditional on relative status, on the previous behavior (or, one might say, the revealed intentions) of others, and on the set of alternative actions available to others, which often affect perceived property rights in the game.
Recent experiments compare the explanatory power of earlier models. Several experiments produce evidence contrary to the (unconditional) distributional preference models. Engelmann and Strobel (2004) report dictator experiments in which a large majority of subjects make choices that are inconsistent with unconditional inequality-averse (or differenceaverse or inequity-averse) preferences. Cox and Sadiraj (2005) report data from two-and four-agent dictator experiments in which the responses of most subjects are inconsistent, respectively, with unconditional inequality-averse and quasi-maximin preferences; they also demonstrate that the unconditional CES utility function in their paper is consistent with data from these experiments. Kagel and Wolfe (2001) find that rejection rates in the ultimatum game are essentially unaffected by unequal (high or low) contingent payments to a passive third player. Their results are contrary to both inequality aversion and to maximin preferences. Charness and Rabin (2002) evaluate two-and three-person sequential games.
When the game tree is truncated, choices in dictator subgames often differ substantially from choices in the same branch of the larger game, which demonstrates that responders' choices depend on the set of alternatives from which proposers choose. In mini-ultimatum games, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003) find that rejection rates depend systematically on alternative offers not chosen by the proposers. We analyze their data in Section 6. Brandts and Charness (2000) consider 2 × 2 bimatrix games preceded by a cheap talk stage and followed by a costly opportunity to reward or punish the other player. They find that deception in the cheap talk stage significantly increases the punishment rate, and that some subjects reward favorable sender behavior. Blount (1995) finds that responders in her ultimatum games accept lower offers more often when they are randomly generated than when they are chosen by human subjects. Offerman (2002) has similar results: intentional helpful (hurtful) actions are rewarded (punished) more frequently than identical but randomly generated actions. A number of more recent papers arrive at similar conclusions. There are some empirical studies that seem more favorable to unconditional distributional preferences than to reciprocal preferences, including Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998) and Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998), but the preponderance of evidence supports the empirical significance of reciprocity and context dependence as elements of distributional preferences. game when it is run with a single-blind protocol but not when it is run with a double-blind protocol. They do not find significant negative reciprocity in the "punishment" game (i.e., the 5/5 mini-ultimatum game) when it is run with a double blind protocol in a triadic design.
In summary, the laboratory evidence confirms that people do care about others' payoffs as well as their own. The marginal rate of substitution (between my payoff and yours)
is not constant, however, and may be affected by reciprocity as well as distributional and status considerations. There is need for a tractable model that can be successfully applied to data from games that differentially reflect subjects' concerns for reciprocity, distribution, and status.
Model specifications
This section presents a model of preferences that incorporates objectively defined variables r and s capturing the effects of reciprocity and status considerations on behavior. For pedagogical and comparative purposes, the presentation here considers only two player extensive form games of perfect information with first mover F receiving material payoff y, With homothetic preferences, all indifference curves have the same slope where they cross any given ray, y/m = constant; in this case relative payoff dependence is well defined.
Fortunately the convenient and well-known constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function represents homothetic preferences. In its most familiar form, the CES utility function is u(m, y) = (m α + θ y α ) 1/α ; see also Andreoni and Miller (2002) . 2 We modify this function slightly. The exponent 1/α is problematic when it applies to a negative expression, which arises when θ is sufficiently negative. Of course, the outside exponent doesn't affect the convexity of the indifference curves, but its sign affects their ordering. The ordering is preserved and the negativity issue is finessed by using the factor 1/α. Hence the preference model is defined for elasticity of substitution (or convexity)
With these preferences we have MRS = The variable s represents relative status (other than relative payoff, which is already accounted for). It refers to a generally recognized asymmetry in players' claims or obligations, e.g., due to differences in age, sex, job title, or effort. In the current paper we examine only shifts in payoff entitlements when an advantageous role is earned rather than awarded randomly. In sections 7 and 8 below, we code status as a real number for each player, e.g., s F and s S respectively for the first and second player, and code relative status as the difference, s = s F − s S . For example, under some social norms the first mover's status and hence s would increase if she had to earn the right to be the first mover or earn her endowment.
These examples are analyzed in Sections 7 and 8.
In estimating the model, we impose two assumptions.
A.1 Individuals choose so as to maximize a utility function of the form in equation (1).
A.2 The emotional state function θ = θ(r, s) is identical across individuals except for a mean zero idiosyncratic term ǫ. Player i's emotional state is then written θ i = θ(r, s) + ǫ i .
3 Konow (2001) elaborates an objective theory of m 0 as a function of the agent's relative actual effort levels ("accountability"), the efficient effort levels, the agents' basic material needs, and the context. Konow In the applications that include reciprocity or status we test the following hypothesis.
H.1
The emotional state function θ(r, s) increases in r and s.
Several comments are in order before proceeding. Assumption A.1 imports the CES utility function from its usual home territory (preferences over bundles of private consumption goods) and applies it to social choice territory (preferences over own and others' material payoffs). When the emotional state θ is positive and the convexity parameter is strictly between its extreme values α = −∞ and α = 1, assumption A.1 implies the usual smooth, downward-sloping, convex indifference curves, as in figure 1 (a). An implication of downward-sloping curves is that a person will give up some of her own payoff when that would sufficiently increase the payoff of another. Thus an individual with positive θ has a taste for efficiency, in that she will often choose to increase the sum of the two payoffs.
When the optimal choice is in a neighborhood of the ray y/m = θ 1 1−α , it maximizes the payoff sum. Also, an implication of strict convexity of the utility function is that the individual's willingness to pay increases as the other's relative income decreases. In this sense she has maximin-like preferences. Such preferences are quite literal in the n-player version of the model described in Section 9: a player's willingness to pay is highest for other player who is the least well off.
Assumption A.1 implies that utility strictly increases in own payoff m. Whether utility increases in other's payoff y depends on the sign of θ. Sometimes it is useful to decompose θ(r, s) as θ(r, s) = θ 0 +θ(r, s), whereθ(0, 0) is zero, and θ 0 is the residual benevolence or malevolence. Thus the typical individual will have standard selfish preferences when θ(r, s) = 0, i.e.,θ(r, s) = −θ 0 . Of course, assumption A.2 then implies that θ i < 0 for some individuals at this point, while θ i > 0 for other individuals.
It might seem natural to assume that the individual idiosyncracies in assumption A.2 have the normal (or Gaussian) distribution, but some of our data suggest otherwise. For example, the normal distribution implies that no matter how kindly the first mover behaves, an occasional second mover will have negative θ, but such churlish behavior is non-existent in some of our data. Therefore our estimation techniques allow for the possibility of either platykurtotic (thin-tailed) error distributions -i.e., distributions between normal and uniform -or leptokurtotic (fat-tailed) error distributions.
We accommodate these error term characteristics with the error function (or exponential power) distribution with density
For c = 1, this distribution reduces to the normal distribution with mean zero and variance . Our estimation strategy lets the data select the error distribution (from among this class) that has the best fit rather than imposing one distribution, such as the normal, a priori.
Finally, note that assumption A.2 and hypothesis H.1 together suggest that most individuals will have negative θ when r and/or s are sufficiently negative. A person with negative θ is willing to pay to reduce another's payoff. That is, y is a "bad" rather than a "good," and the indifference curves slope upward. CES preferences then have one straight line indifference curve, the ray y/m = |θ| −1/α corresponding to u = 0, and the slopes of other indifference curves converge towards the slope of this ray as in figure 1 (b).
Altruism in dictator games
In our first application, we examine choices in a dictator game. Although this game has an especially simple structure, it allows us to demonstrate cleanly that the utility function in equation (1) together with the idiosyncratic error terms in equation (2) explain choices well. Since the baseline dictator sessions include neither reciprocity nor status, the analysis spotlights the role of non-reciprocal altruism or benevolence θ 0 . In Section 8 we examine the role of status arising from an earned endowment treatment for the dictator game.
In the baseline dictator games reported by Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), roles are assigned randomly and subjects assigned to the dictator role are provided with an endowment of either ω = $10 or ω = $40 which they split between themselves and the other player. From assumptions A.1 and A.2 the dictator's utility in this game is
, where x is the amount offered by the dictator to the other player. For α positive 4 , the utility maximization condition is
The estimation strategy begins from the observation that, for given values of α and θ 0 , the probability that x is the solution to equation (3) is the probability that ǫ falls within a particular interval (ǫ x−1 , ǫ x ). As explained in appendix A.2, the threshold values ǫ x (where the optimal actions switch) are determined by a well behaved function of the parameters α and θ 0 , once the distribution is specified for the idiosyncratic error ǫ. From the error term distribution specification in equation (2) and the utility maximization condition in equation (3), we can write the probability of choice x in the ω-game in terms of the
The Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren baseline treatment data consist of twenty-six dic- Parameter estimates -obtained by maximizing the log likelihood -and standard errors are shown in table 1. 5 We also test the hypothesis that θ 0 = 0 and find that the χ 2 test statistic is χ 2 (1) = 22.598, which has p-value less than p = 0.0001. The two graphs in figure 2 show the indifference curves from the estimated utility function (with individual-subject idiosyncratic error term set equal to its mean value of 0; see assumption A.2). In the ω = $10 dictator game in the left graph, sufficiently positive idiosyncratic terms ǫ i lead to offers of 3, 4, or 5 in our utility and choice model, while sufficiently negative values of ǫ i lead to offers of 0 or 1. In the ω = $40 game, offers above (or below) $10 only occur when ǫ i is positive (or negative).
This application of the model highlights unconditional altruism in the dictator game data. More importantly, it demonstrates how to incorporate individual-subject differences in a tractable and parsimonious way. The application also provides a helpful benchmark for the status effect presented in Section 8, and for reciprocity in the next application.
Reciprocity in Stackelberg duopoly games
Like dictators, second movers in a Stackelberg game choose joint payoffs from a range of possible choices, but unlike dictators their utility may respond to first mover behavior. In the standard textbook analysis of this game, S responds to F 's output x by choosing the selfish best reply output q = These second mover choice patterns arise naturally from our emotional state dependent utility function. The intuition is that F is greedier when he chooses a larger x, which pushes the reciprocity variable r(x) towards more negative values. Hence S has a more negative emotional state θ, and therefore chooses output above the selfish best reply to reduce F 's payoff y. The smooth curve in figure 4 indicates the best response of a second mover with such a concern for reciprocity. This illustrates the basic point that S is more inclined to overproduce (relative to selfish best response) when the output of x by F is larger. 
The residual benevolence term θ 0 cannot be identified separately from the property rights 
In interpreting the estimate of the neutral first mover choice x 0 , one should remember that it incorporates residual benevolence as well as property rights. This convention does not affect our test of assumption H.1, since absorption of θ 0 into m 0 does not affect a.
Now write the second mover's utility function in terms of the players' choices by substituting the payoff functions m(x, q) and y(x, q) into equation (1) to obtain
Set the derivative of (5) with respect to q equal to 0, and simplify to obtain the first order condition (24 − x − 2 q) q α−1 − θ i x α = 0. Although this first-order condition is valid for all α ≤ 1, it can be solved for q = q * (x ; θ, α) in closed form only in special cases. Appendix A.3
demonstrates that a unique maximizer for equation (5) exists for every parameter vector
, so the best response q * (x ; θ, α) is well defined. Appendix A.4
describes the algorithm used to determine q * (x ; θ, α).
Using equation (4), expand q * (x ; α, θ) as q * (x ; α, a, x 0 ). As in the previous application, we assume that ǫ has an error function distribution, with the density in equation (2) . The estimation procedure finds the convexity parameter α, the reciprocity sensitivity a, the reference output x 0 , and the error distribution parameters b and c that maximize the log likelihood function ln L(α, a, x 0 , b, c ; x, q) =
] for the 220 observed choice pairs (x i , q i ). 6 The estimation procedure is described in appendix A.5.
Parameter Table 2 shows parameter estimates and standard errors. The estimated best-response function is shown in figure 4 ; figure 5 shows indifference curves from the estimated utility function that correspond in one case to x = 4 and in the other to x = 12.
Parameter estimates allow us to test hypothesis H.1, that the emotional state θ increases in reciprocity r. The null hypothesis is that a = 0, i.e., that second movers may respond to distributional concerns but they do not respond to reciprocity concerns. The very positiveâ estimate is strong but indirect evidence that the HMN data reflect reciprocity and not just inequality aversion. A piece of direct evidence is that 11 of 38
responses to x = 8 were q > 8 and one was q < 8. 7 These responses are consistent with our 6 Six of 220 output pairs result in negative payoffs to both players. Since our utility function is defined only for nonnegative payoffs, we truncate these six observations q i to q ′ i = 24 − x i implying zero payoffs. 7 In this game, second mover output q = 8 is the only response consistent with inequality aversion when the first mover chooses output x = 8. For x = 8, the line y = m passes through the vertex payoffs, so that for any inequality averse utility function, the vertex payoff maximizes utility.
model, given the property right estimate, but are inconsistent with inequality aversion (or selfish optimization). 8 This application demonstrates that reciprocity (and especially negative reciprocity) appears to be a very significant motive in Stackelberg duopoly games. The model also captures individual-subject differences in reciprocity in a tractable and parsimonious way.
6 Reciprocity and property rights in mini-ultimatum games
The next application, mini-ultimatum games (Bolton and Zwick, 1995; Gale, Binmore, and
Samuelson, 1995) 9 also demonstrates the importance of reciprocity, and provides a unique insight into the second mover's perception of his property rights. In mini-ultimatum games, the first mover F (the "proposer") offers one of two possible payoff vectors, and the second mover S (the "responder") either accepts the offer, which then becomes the actual payoff vector, or else refuses, in which case the payoff is (m, y) = (0, 0). The FFF data clearly contradict the traditional assumption of self-interested preferences, which implies that S will never choose a zero payoff when she can obtain a positive payoff 8 An anonymous referee points out that, more generally, in our model equal payoffs can be a "benchmark for reciprocity. This offers a potential explanation to the puzzling result that the inequality aversion models appear to do very well in games where reciprocity can be an issue but appear to do much worse in games where reciprocity is irrelevant." The inconsistency of much of the Stackelberg data with inequality aversion
indicates that inequality aversion models may not always perform well even in games that involve reciprocity. 9 Binmore condemns the term mini-ultimatum game or MUG, which we perpetuate, and favors ultimatum mini-game. As a compromise, we urge readers to parse MUG as mini-[ultimatum game]. (e.g., S will never choose to Punish). The data also contradict the distributional models reviewed earlier, which imply that S cares only about the final allocation, not how it came about. In the FFF data, the Punish rate of the (m, y) = (2, 8) offer is almost 50% in the 5/5 game where F could have offered an even split, while the Punish rate of the same offer is less than 10% in the 10/0 game where F 's alternative is to keep the entire pie to himself.
These features of the data are natural consequences in our model of the reciprocity variable r(x) in the emotional state (or WTP ) function θ for the second mover. A more generous offer by F increases r(x), which in turn increases the value of θ, thus reducing the probability that S will choose to Punish or Reject. Of course, generosity is gauged relative to available opportunities. Thus the property right m 0 will differ across the four games, and the rejection rate of a particular offer will be higher when it is less generous relative to the alternative offer.
Our empirical analysis of the FFF data begins with coding responder choice by
We construct the explanatory variables according to assumptions A.1 and A.2 as follows.
The status variable s is constant here because the FFF data contain no variation in status (other than relative payoff), so s = s F − s S = 0. Take a first-order Taylor expansion of the expression in A.2 to write an individual's emotional state as θ i = θ 0 + a r(x) + ǫ i , where the coefficient a is the responsiveness to reciprocity. As in the previous application, we assume that the density for ǫ i is given in equation (2).
A key empirical issue is how the property right m 0,k varies across the four games (10 − k)/k for k = 0, 2, 5, and 8. Some authors specify property rights a priori, but data provide direct evidence, so we instead estimate property rights. For x = "Take" the reci- for the experiment data sample. 11 Table 3 shows parameter estimates and standard errors. We conclude from this application that reciprocity has a major impact on second mover behavior in mini-ultimatum games as well as in Stackelberg games. In addition, the set of available alternatives clearly affects perceived property rights, and these perceived rights affect behavior.
Status and reciprocity in ultimatum games
Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994, HMSS hereafter) report ultimatum games with several treatments that include status variables. The baseline treatment R has random role assignment, in which it is natural to assign status variables zero to both the first and second movers. The contest role assignment treatment S assigns individual subjects to first and second mover roles based on their performance on a quiz: subjects with scores in the top half are assigned to the first mover role. Since the advantageous first mover role is "earned"
in the contest assignment treatment, the second mover's perceived entitlement may shrink.
To test this conjecture, it is natural to set first mover status to 1 in this treatment and keep second mover status at 0.
In the HMSS ultimatum game, the first mover proposes an allocation x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}
for the second mover and 10 − x for himself. The second mover then either accepts that 
As in the previous applications, we assume that the individual subject idiosyncrasy variable ǫ i has the error function distribution with the density in equation (2) . Then the probability that Z(x) = 1 may be written in terms of the model parameters as
where once again F (z; b, c) is the CDF for the error function.
To construct the log likelihood function, consider the data for x = 3. In the R (or s = 0) treatment there are two acceptances and there is one rejection, and in the S (or s = 1) treatment there are nine acceptances and there is no rejection. Hence
Using analogous definitions for the other observed offers x = 2, 4, and 5 we obtain This application reveals the significance of status as a determinant of behavior in ultimatum games. It also demonstrates that our structural estimation strategy robustly accommodates individual-subject idiosyncrasies.
Further applications
This section describes three additional applications of the model, using the same empirical With status represented as an indicator variable when dictators' earn the endowment, the dictator's weight θ on the other player's payoff can be modeled as
The maximization problem can be framed in terms of the utility function parameters α, θ 0 , and a and the error term distribution parameters b and c as max
Parameter 
Preference for efficiency in a dictator game
The dictator game from Cox (2004) provides direct evidence that our model captures a concern for efficiency. Players in this game start with the endowment (m, y) = (10, 10).
Following the transfer by the dictator, the passive recipient receives three additional units of payoff for each unit transferred by the dictator; thus positive transfers increase efficiency.
If the number of dictators who transferred i units (for i between zero and ten) is denoted g i , then the data are represented by the vector g = (11, 3, 1, 2, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 2, 4) . The estimation procedure for this game is similar to the one used in Section 4 for the baseline dictator game from Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren. Parameter estimates and standard errors for this game are shown in table 6.
Parameter Table 6 : Parameter estimates and standard errors from dictator game
The probability distribution over choices that results from these parameter estimates implies an average transfer from the second mover (or dictator) of 4.08 units to the first mover, which represents a substantial preference for efficiency compared to self-regarding (or "economic man") preferences.
Reciprocity in the moonlighting game allocations that result from these first mover choices are shown as circles in figure 7 . All lie on the first mover budget set formed from the two line segments between the points (5, 15), (10, 10) , and (40, 0). Second movers then select an amount y to transfer to or take from the first mover. This can be any positive amount less than or equal to the amount that the second mover has available, or it can be negative. A negative transfer by the second mover represents a penalty that reduces first mover payoff by three times the amount transferred (but does not make it negative). Final allocations that follow second mover choices are shown as squares in the figure (unless there is no transfer by the second mover, in which case it remains at the interim allocation).
This game has complicated choice sets, but our general procedure still applies. The normalized reciprocity function is r(x) = (10 + (1 + 2 Sign(x)) |x| − m 0 )/35 and the second mover's weight on first mover payoff is θ i = a r(x) + ǫ i . As usual, the key step in the estimation procedure is to determine -for given utility function parameters and error term parameters -the probability of each choice that is available to S. To illustrate, suppose that the first mover chooses x = 1. The interim allocation then is (m, y) = (13, 9), and S chooses an allocation from the set {(13 − y, 9 + y)} 13 y=0 ∪ {(13 − y, 9 − 3 y)} 3 y=0 . This choice set is more complicated than in the dictator or Stackelberg games, but the procedure again is to determine threshold values of ǫ that correspond to each possible choice. The choice probabilities applied to the data determine the likelihood function.
Much of the data lies at corners and kinks of the second mover's opportunity set. This is predicted by our model: for a range of values of θ in a neighborhood of zero the optimal second mover transfer is zero. This occurs frequently for negative or low values of the first mover transfer x, and much less frequently for larger values of x, since these induce a higher value for the reciprocity function r(x). There are two data points which our model does not predict. When the first mover chooses x = −5, then one portion of the second mover budget set is the line segment between (0, 0) and (5, 15) . Figure 1 (b) shows that indifference curves for θ < 0 can't be tangent to this line segment, hence the model predicts that the data will cluster at the points (0, 0) and (5, 15) . The data points at (1, 3) and (4, 12) differ by one unit from these corners; to expedite the analysis we move them to the corners. We also moved a third stray data point -a gift of one unit by a second mover after the first mover took five units -to (5, 15) on the presumption that it was an error (or possibly an ironic gesture) by the second mover, not an expression of genuine altruism. Parameter estimates and standard errors are shown in Table 7 : Parameter estimates and standard errors from moonlighting game Estimated indifference curves passing through (10, 10) and (20, 20) in figure 7 correspond to offers x = 0 and x = 10. The curves show that the emotional state of the typical second mover switches from slightly negative to very positive over this range of first mover choices, indicating once again that reciprocity plays a major role. Thus the model captures the tendency of second movers to reward first movers who make higher offers.
Discussion
We hypothesize that a person's desire to help or harm others depends on emotional states that arise from a reciprocity motive and from status considerations. In this paper we propose a simple parametric model incorporating this hypothesis.
The first hurdle for an empirical model is tractability: can the model be estimated from available data? We obtained an affirmative answer by applying a structural estimation procedure to six existing data sets.
The baseline treatment from the first data set, a dictator game, illustrates our basic model of other-regarding preferences. Dictators' choices exhibit residual altruism, independently of reciprocity motives or status considerations. The estimates indicate uniformly distributed individual idiosyncracies for greater or lesser altruism. The earned endowment treatment in the same data set provides evidence that status significantly affects the emotional state function θ, which determines the weight placed on the other player's payoff.
The second data set, a Stackelberg duopoly game, involves output choices from a range of values by a first and second mover. Parameter estimates indicate strong reciprocity, which is primarily negative but positive as well for low first-mover output (as in figure 5 (a) ). Here and elsewhere, reciprocity better accounts for the data than simple inequality aversion. The third data set, mini-ultimatum games, consists of binary choices by second movers following binary choices by first movers. The parameter estimates and tests of hypotheses show that unchosen alternatives affect perceived property rights, and that choices reflect reciprocity based on these perceived rights.
The fourth data set, an ultimatum game with a status treatment, demonstrates that status systematically alters the property right or reference payoff of the second mover. The fifth data set, from a dictator control treatment for the investment game, demonstrates that decision makers have a preference for efficiency. Finally, the moonlighting game demonstrates the flexibility of our estimation procedure and provides additional evidence that distributional preferences are conditional on reciprocity.
Of course, to be considered successful and important, an empirical model must jump 
The natural extension of assumption A.2 is that θ j = θ(r j , s j ) + ǫ j , i.e., the emotional attitude depends on player-pair specific reciprocity experience r j and relative status s j . Of course, in games where players can't separately identify the other players, there is only one θ. For games in which each player can observe the individual history of every other player, the model could be enriched to include an indirect reciprocity motive as well as the direct motive captured in r.
Once other-regarding preference models are thoroughly explored, it may be worthwhile to use them to construct complete models of behavior in extensive form games of perfect information. It is natural to assume that the first mover maximizes the expectation of a utility function that has the same form as the second mover's utility function, as in the dictator game application in Section 4.
Such an extension, however, raises two new issues. First, what are the first mover's beliefs regarding second mover behavior? 12 One could, for example, assume that the first mover acts as if she knows the empirical distribution of second mover behavior, or at least 12 The empirical importance of such beliefs is supported by significant differences between first mover its mean. Second, and more distinctively for our model, does the first mover's θ function respond to prospective reciprocity? One could set r = 0 since the second mover hasn't actually done anything at the time the first mover makes her choice. Departures from selfish optimality (i.e., θ = 0) then would be attributed to status considerations (s = 0) and/or residual benevolence or malevolence (θ 0 = 0) in addition to expectations about prospective second mover changes in m and y. But it is likely in multi-round experiments with fixed matching and possible in random re-matching experiments that a first mover's experiences in earlier matchings will affect his emotional state in a manner best captured by r = 0.
The equilibrium models based on psychological games impose strong assumptions regarding both issues. First, they assume that expectations are based on equilibrium beliefs (direct and higher order). Second, they implicitly assume that prospective second mover behavior produces as strong an emotional response as actual behavior. We hesitate to impose such strong assumptions a priori. Both issues, we believe, should be resolved empirically.
The same two issues arise in normal form games, in games of incomplete information, and in games where a given player has several moves. When these two issues are resolved, we believe our approach can be extended to such games.
Our approach has several advantages that might survive beyond the current implementation. First of all, it uses a model of preferences and choice, not equilibrium, and so is tractable and extensible. Second, it is more flexible than unconditional distributional preference models in that it takes other motives into account. Third, it is open to new findings in the psychology of emotions and so may facilitate interdisciplinary cross-fertilization.
behavior in investment and trust games and in dictator control treatments with the same respective feasible sets and message spaces (Cox, 2004; Cox and Deck, 2005 ).
Appendix A.1: Utility function for α = 0
Since we use a CES utility function with the factor 1/α rather than the exponent 1/α, we verify that the limit utility function is also a Cobb-Douglas utility function for our alternative specification.
We want to show that for α = 0, the indifference curves of u(m, y ; α) converge to indiffer- The key idea in the formulation of the likelihood function for the choice of the amount x sent by the dictator is that for parameter values α and θ 0 , the utility maximizing choice of x is a function of the idiosyncratic error ǫ. As ǫ varies there are critical values where the utility maximizing choice changes, and the range of values of ǫ that support a given choice determine the probability of that choice through the distribution function for ǫ.
Suppose that ǫ has the error function distribution in equation (2) . For fixed values of the dictator utility function parameters, the optimal choice of x depends only on ǫ. The values of x are in the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , 10}, so we want to determine threshold values ǫ x such that u(x, ; α, θ 0 , ǫ x , b, c) = u(x + 1 ; α, θ 0 , ǫ x , b, c). For ǫ ∈ (−∞, ǫ 0 ), the optimal choice is x = 0. For each x ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 9}, when ǫ ∈ (ǫ x−1 , ǫ x ), the optimal choice is x. When ǫ ∈ (ǫ 9 , ∞) the optimal choice is x = 10. The probability of x can therefore be determined from the cumulative distribution function F (z; b, c) of the error function distribution.
The probability of x = 0 is F (ǫ 0 ; b, c). For x ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 9} the probability of x is F (ǫ x , b, c) −
Finally, for x = 10, the probability of x is 1 − F (ǫ 9 ; b, c). These probabilities determine the likelihood function
and maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by maximizing this function (or its logarithm). The second mover best-response function in the Stackelberg game cannot be solved in closed form, except in a few special cases. The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that nevertheless the best-response function is well-defined and has a unique maximizer for all values of the parameters. 
Proof: We partition the space of values for θ, α, and x into a connected (relatively) open set A with a unique interior solution to the utility maximization problem and into a connected closed set B with a boundary solution to the utility maximization problem. The boundary between sets A and B, which depends on θ, α, and x, is characterized by the function θ(x, α) = −
Region B is subdivided into regions B 1 and B 2 . In region B 1 the utility function is bounded because In order to evaluate properties of U (x, q), it is useful to represent the output q of S as The derivative of this utility function is
For c ∈ (0, 1),Ũ 2 α when α < −2, the conclusion of the lemma follows. Consequently, there is a boundary maximum ofŨ x (c) at c = 1, i.e., q * = 24 − x.
Proof: It is clear from equation (A.3.1) thatŨ x (c) is bounded for c ∈ [0, c ′ ]. As c → 1, the term (1 − c) α → ∞ for α < 0, and the first and third terms are both finite, soŨ x (c) → ∞ if the last term, c α (24 − x) α + θ x α , tends to a negative limit as c → 1. Since θ < θ(x, α) in region B 2 and this expression is equivalent to (24 − x) α + θ x α < 0, the claim follows.
Claim 4: For α = 0, there is a unique maximum of U (x, q) at q * = 24−x 2+θ when θ > −1 and there is a unique maximum of U (x, q) at q * = 24 − x when θ ≤ −1.
Proof: This follows immediately from the utility maximization problem for α = 0.
Claim 5: For α = 1, there is a unique maximum of U (x, q) at q * = 12 − 1+θ 2 x when θ > θ(x, 1) and there is a unique maximum of U (x, q) at q * = 24 − x when θ ≤ θ(x, 1).
Proof: This follows immediately from the utility maximization problem for α = 1.
Appendix A.4: Calculation of the Stackelberg best-response function q * (x ; θ, α)
Claims 2 and 3 in appendix A.3 demonstrates that for all (x, θ, α) ∈ B 1 ∪B 2 (where θ < θ(x, α)), U (x, q) takes on its maximum at q = 24 − x. Claim 1 demonstrates that (1) if (x, θ, α) ∈ A, then U ′ (x, 0) = ∞ and U ′ (x, 24 − x) < 0 and (2) U ′ (x, q) has a single root in (0, 24 − x). We use (1) and (2) to calculate q * (x ; a, x 0 , α). Since the derivative is infinite at q = 0, we start by evaluating U ′ (x, 1). If U ′ (x, 1) > 0 we use the secant method with U ′ (x, 1) and U ′ (x, 24 − x) to find q * such that U ′ (x, q * ) = 0. If U ′ (x, 1) < 0, we bisect the interval until we find 2 −k such that U ′ (x, 2 −k ) > 0, and then apply the secant method to identify q * such that U ′ (x, q * ) = 0.
Appendix A.5: Stackelberg duopoly likelihood function
As in the dictator game, for fixed values of the utility function parameters, the optimal choice is a function of ǫ. Threshold values of ǫ determine the points at which optimal choices change. Suppose that ǫ has the error function distribution in equation (2) . We want to determine threshold values ǫ q such that U (x, q ; α, a, θ(x, ǫ q ), b, c) = U (x, q + 1 ; α, a, θ(x, ǫ q ), b, c), for q ∈ {3, 4, 5, . . . , 15}. For ǫ ∈ (ǫ 3 , ∞), the optimal choice is q = 3. For each q ∈ {4, 5, 6, . . . , 14}, when ǫ ∈ (ǫ q , ǫ q−1 ), the optimal choice is q. When ǫ ∈ (−∞, ǫ 14 ) the optimal choice is q = 15. The probability of q can therefore be determined from the cumulative distribution function F (z; b, c) of the error function distribution.
The probability of q = 3 is 1 − F (ǫ 3 ; b, c). For q ∈ {4, 5, 6, . . . , 14} the probability of q is and maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by maximizing this function (or its logarithm).
Standard errors estimates are obtained from the numerical Hessian matrix, as the square roots of its diagonal elements.
